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Abstract 
This paper explores the effect of broadening financial market access on inequality. I cha-
racterize in a parsimonious model of endogenous market participation how capital in-
come inequality depends on financial market costs. A Kuznets curve type of relationship is 
uncovered under DARA utility. Data on the contribution of capital income to inequality 
(CKI) in eleven countries is presented against a measure of equity trading costs. Consis-
tently with the model, during the last few decades of improving market access, the CKI 
has tended to increase where trading costs have been high, and to decrease where these 
costs have been low enough. The results imply that financial liberalization may have 
differential effects for inequality in advanced and in emerging economies. 
1. Introduction 
Interest in income distribution has grown following an increase in inequality 
in several industrialized countries over recent decades. The consensus explanation sees 
skill-biased technical change as one of its main sources. The spread of computers and 
advances in communication technologies are supposed to have increased the relative 
demand for skilled workers. As a result, labor income differentials across skill groups 
have increased.1  
Labor income differentials are indeed likely to be the most relevant factor ac-
counting for the recent increase in income inequality (see (Piketty, 2005)). However, 
changes in income from other sources can also be relevant. Jenkins (1995), for in-
stance, analyzes the contribution of different sources of income to the UK’s increase 
in inequality during the 1980s. He finds that more than half of the increase in income 
inequality can be attributed to self-employment income. Furthermore, the contri-
bution of capital income to the change in inequality is similar to the contribution of 
labor earnings. Jenkins’ analysis shows that sources of income other than from labor 
may be important for understanding changes in inequality. Indeed, relevant macro-
economic factors that have been shown to be closely related to inequality (such as 
inflation – see (Bulir, 2001); or the interest rate – see (Piketty, 1997), and (Brueckner 
et al., 2007) are likely to operate via the distribution of capital income.  
* The author would like to thank Giuseppe Bertola, Luigi Guiso, Omar Licandro, Raquel Fernandez,
Michael Haliassos, Karl Schlag, Thijs Van Rens, and Francesc Ortega as well as the participants of 
the Inequality session at the EEA Conference in Stockholm 2003 for helpful comments and discussions.
All errors are mine. 
 The literature relating skill-biased technical change to wage inequality is enormous. See (Acemoglu,
2002) for a recent contribution and (Card and DiNardo, 2002) for a critical discussion. Johnson (1997) 
and Katz and Autor (1999) offer a survey where the skill-biased technical change hypothesis is put in 
the broader perspective of the recent increase in earnings inequality. 
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In this paper, I study the effect of financial market access on capital income 
inequality. This provides a novel channel through which technological progress af-
fects inequality. In particular, new technologies have lowered the costs of access to 
financial markets, prompting participation. Those entering the financial market have 
experienced capital income gains, hence reshaping the distribution of capital in-
come.2 Indeed, household portfolios have experienced dramatic transformations in 
recent decades of accelerating technical change. In a book edited by Guiso, Halias-
sos, and Jappelli (2002), the editors note a significant move in household portfolios 
over recent decades towards more risky asset holdings, mostly driven by an increase 
in market participation. The increase has concerned both direct stock market parti-
cipation and indirect participation through mutual funds and investment trusts.3 One 
of the factors consistently emphasized in the literature accounting for this transforma-
tion is that the costs of participating in the financial market have decreased sub-
stantially – see (Poterba, 2001), and the Introduction chapter in (Guiso et al., 2002). 
Indeed, Rea et al. (2000) and Domowitz et al. (2001) provide evidence on the de-
crease in mutual fund fees and equity trading costs, respectively.  
This paper studies how capital income inequality depends on financial market 
participation costs, using a parsimonious one-period model of endogenous market 
participation. In the model, individuals heterogeneous in their wealth holdings face 
the decision to participate in a financial market costly to access. Returns to the fi-
nancial market are taken as fixed and considered to be risky. The model yields 
a Kuznets curve type of relationship between inequality and participation costs. In 
countries where participation costs are low, those who enter the financial market as 
access becomes easier are relatively poor, and their access drives capital income 
inequality downwards. The reverse occurs where participation costs are high. Thus, if 
financial access is broad enough, the negative effects of technological progress on 
inequality via labor income differentials may be tempered by its effects on partici-
pation costs.  
The empirical implications of the model are considered: during the recent de-
cades of technical improvement, where financial market participation has generally 
increased, the impact on inequality should depend on the level of participation costs. 
Data limitations imply that the empirical analysis carried out cannot be but crude. 
I discuss evidence on a measure of capital income inequality in eleven OECD coun-
tries and on equity trading costs. These data suggest that, during the last few decades, 
and consistently with the predictions of the model, in countries where trading costs 
are higher capital income inequality has increased and vice versa. A numerical exam-
ple of the model shows that, under sensible conditions, the model can yield changes 
in inequality of considerable magnitude. This exercise thus lends credibility to the in-
terpretation of the data suggested in this paper. Nevertheless, several caveats need to 
2 Returns to financial market participation can, indeed, be substantial, especially in the long run. Guo 
(2001) provides an example illustrating the significance of the difference between stock market and risk-
less returns over long periods of time. From 1871 to 1998, the continuously compounding stock mar-
ket return was around 7 percent per year while the riskless return was 2.4 percent. With compounding, 
the implication of these differences in returns becomes substantial. One dollar invested in 1925 would
have yielded 13 USD by 1996 if invested in the short-term government bond, but 1,370 USD if invested in 
large company stocks. 
3 See the Introduction chapter in (Guiso et al., 2002) for details. 
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be borne in mind. Notably, the proposed interpretation hinges on considering trading 
costs as a proxy for a fixed cost. The data presented expresses trading costs in 
proportional terms. However, in reality, fees paid in the financial services sector are 
non-linear in the amount invested. Typically, larger investors face lower rates. As 
a result, considering financial trading costs as fixed can be a good approximation.  
The model proposed in this paper relates to the literature on financial market 
participation and inequality, including (Greenwood, Jovanovic, 1990), (Guvenen, 
2006), and (Peress, 2003). These models analyze complex environments where fi-
nancial market participation plays a role and study the implications for inequality. 
Contrary to these, the present paper focuses explicitly on the relationship between 
inequality and participation in a simple environment where mechanisms are trans-
parent, and uncovers the non-linearities arising from this relationship.  
The results of this paper can yield relevant insights for financial liberalization 
and inequality. They suggest that financial liberalization, when broadening access to 
the market, may have differential effects for emerging and advanced economies: libe-
ralization would decrease inequality in advanced economies but increase it in emerg-
ing ones. Current empirical research on financial development and inequality yields 
mixed results: for instance, Beck et al. (2007) and Clarke et al. (2006) find that finan-
cial development reduces inequality, whereas Jaumotte et al. (2008) find the oppo-
site. All use as measure for financial development essentially private credit over 
GDP, a measure that does not distinguish between financial deepening and financial 
broadening. The present paper argues for focusing on the possible non-linearities of 
the relationship and for disentangling financial deepening from broadening when 
measuring financial development (see also (Claesens, Perotti, 2007).4  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a parsimonious model of 
costly financial market participation and derives the implications of the model for 
inequality. Section 3 considers the empirical implications of the model, presenting 
data on inequality and proxies of participation costs. Section 4 brings together the re-
sults of the model with the data presented, dealing with quantitative issues and com-
menting on some caveats that need to be borne in mind when interpreting the data. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2. A Model of Financial Market Participation 
2.1 Economic Environment 
Consider an economy populated by individuals, indexed by i, who are iden-
tical except in their level of wealth holdings wi. The distribution of wealth is cha-
racterized by the cumulative distribution function G (w) with support [0 )f   It is 
assumed that G is continuous and differentiable. At the beginning of the period, 
agents can invest their wealth in two assets, a risky asset and a safe asset. Investment 
in the safe asset is costless and yields a certain return 1 r . Investment in the risky 
asset requires the payment of a fixed cost f that represents brokerage fees, infor-
mation costs or the opportunity cost of time learning how the financial market works. 
4 Clarke et al. (2006) and Jaumotte et al. (2008) do consider (and reject) threshold effects in the relation 
between their measure of financial development and inequality, but do not distinguish between broadening
and deepening. 
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The risky asset yields an uncertain excess return over the safe asset of x , with mean 
x . It is assumed that 0x ! ; i.e., that the expected returns of the risky asset are 
higher than the safe returns. Individuals who invest in the risky asset are said 
to participate in the financial market. At the end of the period, individuals collect 
the returns on their investments and consume them all.  
Individuals derive utility from end of period consumption. The utility func-
tion u is assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, and exhibiting decreasing absolute 
risk aversion (DARA). Thus, 0uc !   0ucc  , and   0d udc u cc  c  The assumption of 
DARA is regarded as sensible in the relevant literature: it formalizes the observation 
that richer individuals are more willing to take additive risks (see (Gollier, 2001)).  
In order to illustrate explicitly the results of the model, a particular speci-
fication of the model is used. In this specification, excess returns of the risky asset 
are assumed to take only two values, Hx  and Lx , with equal probability, where 
 10
2L H L
x x x   ; i.e., the financial market yields higher returns than the riskless 
asset on average, but lower in the bad state   Furthermore, in this specification, the uti-
lity function u is assumed to be logarithmic; i.e., ( ) log( )u c c .  
2.2 Financial Market Participation 
Individuals in this economy decide to participate in the financial market if 
the expected utility they obtain by participating evaluated at its optimal portfolio 
choice is larger than the utility they obtain by not participating. The value obtained 
by an individual i not participating in the financial market iNV  is, simply,  
                                              1i iNV u w r                                            (2.1) 
Individuals who participate in the financial market need to decide the share of 
their wealth to invest in the risky asset, denoted by ʌ. Their value function iPV  equals:  
                                    1i iPV E u w f r xS ª º   « »¬ ¼                              (2.2) 
where the optimal portfolio choice S   solves the first-order condition,  
                                    1 0iE u w f r x xS ª ºc     « »¬ ¼                               (2.3) 
Individual i will participate in the financial market if the value of participating 
is larger than the value of not participating: if i iP NV V!   Whether this holds or not 
depends on i’s wealth level. In particular, the participation decision of different 
individuals is characterized by the wealth level of the indifferent individual, for 
whom i iP NV V . The wealth threshold corresponding to the indifferent individual is 
denoted by w . Lemma 1 states the relationship between wealth, participation deci-
sions, and fixed costs in this model.  
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Lemma 1: For given f, there is a unique w  such that i iP NV V . 
i) Participation decisions are characterized as follows:  
iw w!    Participates in the Financial Market. 
iw w    Does not participate in the Financial Market. 
ii) w  ( f ) is strictly increasing.  
Proof: See Appendix A.5  
 
With DARA utility, risk exposure increases with wealth. Therefore, only indi-
viduals wealthy enough invest in the risky asset a sufficient amount so that their 
returns compensate for the fixed costs. As a result, individuals with wealth higher 
than w  will participate in the financial market and those with wealth lower than w  
will not. By the same argument, an increase in participation costs requires the indif-
ferent individual to be wealthier and, hence, raises the wealth threshold w . An equi-
valent result has been shown to hold in more complex settings, using CRRA utility. 
For instance, Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), in a multi-period model with unin-
surable labor income risk, find that richer individuals require higher fixed costs in 
order to be kept out of the market than poorer ones.  
For the log utility case with two-state returns, the wealth threshold w  can be 
derived explicitly. Solving the first-order condition (3) for this case yields a portfolio 
choice of:  
 
   
1
2 1
H L
H L
x x
r
x x
S     
and equating iPV  and 
i
NV  yields a wealth threshold for the indifferent individual of:  
                                                         
1
w f
X
X                                                       (2.4) 
where 
 
 2
H L
H L
x x
x x
X {

, and measures the utility returns from the financial market.6  
Expression (2.4) makes clear that the indifferent individual has wealth such that her 
utility returns from the financial market (  1 wX   ) compensate for the fixed costs. 
As fixed costs increase, the indifferent individual needs to be richer.  
5 The results in the lemma follow naturally from the effect of wealth on optimal portfolio choice. Thus, 
the proof is largely based on standard results displayed in Gollier (2001). 
6 To derive X , just note that, with log utility, equation 2.2 becomes: 
   log log 1i iPV E w Ef r xS ª º ª º    « » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ . X  is defined so that      log log 1 log 1E r x rX S ª º    « »¬ ¼ . 
Plugging S   into that expression and using the simple two-state returns random variable for x  imme-
diately brings the value of X . 
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2.3 Capital Income 
The expected capital income of each individual depends crucially on her ini-
tial wealth and participation status. Since the participation status of each individual is 
determined endogenously by her level of initial wealth, it follows that capital income 
is ultimately characterized in relation to initial wealth. For simplicity, I consider capi-
tal income net of fixed costs. The function relating expected capital income to initial 
wealth in the population iE k wª º§ ·¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼  is a piece-wise defined function where the com-
ponents are the expected capital income of financial market participants iPE k w
ª º§ ·¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼  
and the capital income of the non-participants Nk   In particular, using lemma 1, 
                      
  if
if 
i i i i
Pi
i i i
N
E k w r w x w w w
E k w
k w rw w w
Sª º § · § ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸« »© ¹ © ¹ª º ¬ ¼§ ·¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼ § ·¨ ¸© ¹
­   !° ®°  ¯


                (2.5) 
 
The following lemma partially characterizes the relationship between expect-
ed capital income and wealth in this model.  
Lemma 2: iE k wª º§ ·¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼  is increasing in 
iw , with a discontinuity at w .  
Proof: See Appendix A.  
 
That capital income and wealth should be positively related in this model is 
straightforward. The discontinuity at the wealth threshold w  stems from two facts. 
First, capital income is considered net of fixed costs.7 Second, and more substan-
tially, risk aversion requires the indifferent individual to reap positive monetary gains 
in order to participate in the risky financial market.  
In the case of log utility and two-state returns, the portfolio choice S   does 
not depend on wealth. Hence, it is straightforward to see how capital income is in-
creasing in wealth and the gains from participation are always positive:  
               
 
   
2
1
2 1
2
H L
i i i iH L
P N
H L
x xx x
E k w k w w r w
x x
S
§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸ª º  © ¹§ · § ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸« »© ¹ © ¹¬ ¼
     
Figure 2.1 illustrates how capital income depends on wealth in this model, 
showing clearly the positive relation between the two variables as well as the dis-
continuity at w . 
2.4 Capital Income Inequality 
In this section, the basic result of the paper is presented in the form of a pro-
position. It is shown that ex ante capital income inequality, as measured by any of 
the standard inequality measures used, is first increasing and then decreasing in 
the level of participation costs. In what follows, for expositional clarity, I will obviate 
7 I consider capital income net of fixed costs for technical reasons, in order to simplify the analysis of 
inequality below. However, this choice is not likely to affect the main result of the paper. 
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the dependence of the different variables on iw  and drop the expectation operator for 
the expected capital income of participants.  
Inequality can be measured in different ways. I consider the most commonly 
used inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient, the family of Generalized Entro-
py (GE) measures, and their ordinal equivalents (i.e., measures that rank distributions  
in the same way as some member of the GE family), which include the variance and 
the square coefficient of variation. For these measures, the following proposition cha-
racterizes how inequality depends on fixed costs in this model.  
Proposition 1: The level of ex-ante inequality I as measured by the Gini coefficient, 
any member of the family of Generalized Entropy, and any ordinally equivalent mea-
sures, satisfies the following property  
There is an  fˆ I  such that:  
                                                        
 
 
ˆ0 if
and
ˆ0 if
dI f f I
df
dI f f I
df
! 
 !
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 1 states that capital income inequality, measured by any of the con-
ventionally used inequality measures, is first increasing in participation costs, and 
then decreasing. The threshold of participation costs where the sign of the slope 
changes (where inequality is highest) depends on the inequality measure used. Figu-
re 2.2 illustrates this result for the Gini coefficient. 
The mechanism underlying Proposition 1 can be grasped by taking the Gini 
coefficient as an illustration. Consider, in particular, the equation representing the mar- 
FIGURE 2.1 
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ginal impact of participation costs on the Gini coefficient (Equation (18) in Appen-
dix A, reproduced here for expositional purposes).  
                                  12
2
P Nd dw Ginik kGini g w G w
df df k
  ª º « »¬ ¼
                    (2.6) 
 
Equation (2.6) is best understood as the product of two terms. The first term is 
the density of the population who leave the financial market   dwg w
df
  times the per-
cent capital income they lose by leaving the market 
 P Nk k
k
  
.8 The second term is 
the position these individuals hold in the distribution of capital income  G w  re-
lative to the overall level of inequality 1
2
Gini . Notice that, in order for inequality to 
change with participation, it is necessary that the indifferent individual sees a dis-
crete jump in her capital income upon changing participation status: if P Nk k    then 
0dGini
df
 . In this model, indeed, individuals who leave the market see their capital 
income decrease by a discrete amount. Hence, the first term is always negative. As 
a result, whether inequality is increasing or decreasing in participation costs (the sign 
of 0dGini
df
 ) depends exclusively on the second term: on whether the indifferent 
individual is high or low in the distribution of capital income relative to the overall 
8 
Pk  and Nk  denote the capital income of the indifferent individual in case of participation and of non-
-participation, respectively. k  denotes the average capital across the population. 
FIGURE 2.2 
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level of inequality. This depends on the level of participation costs   Thus, when par-
ticipation is sufficiently easy to access, the indifferent individual is low in the dis-
tribution of income relative to the level of inequality, and inequality will increase as 
this individual leaves the market. Eventually, as participation costs become suf-
ficiently high, the indifferent individual will be high in the distribution relative to 
overall inequality, and inequality will decrease as she leaves the market.  
More sophisticated models of financial market participation would also gene-
rate the result of Proposition 1. For example, a model with heterogeneity in ability 
and initial wealth where the financial market participation decision is taken after 
labor income is realized will work in a similar fashion. One would simply have to 
consider wealth holdings iw  as the sum of labor income and initial wealth. The re-
maining developments go through in the same manner. Indeed, the crucial ingre-
dients for the result to hold are that the wealth of the indifferent individual is 
increasing in participation costs and that new participants experience a capital 
income gain. These ingredients are generally ensured when the financial market is 
risky and the utility of individuals exhibits concavity and DARA. More sophisticated 
models of financial market participation need not yield such a clean result as the one 
in Proposition 1. The mechanism driving the result, however, would generally still be 
present.  
3. Cross-Country Evidence on Participation, Participation Costs, and Inequality 
Cross-country data on financial market participation and on capital income 
inequality is scarce, mainly because a population survey is required in order to con-
struct each data point. Empirical exercises using participation costs are even more 
problematic, for these costs include components impossible to measure accurately, 
such as the opportunity costs of time spent understanding how the financial market 
works. With these limitations in mind, this section proceeds to bring the model to 
bear on available data (see Appendix B Table B0 for an overview of the data used).  
The source of inequality data presented in this chapter is the study by Forster 
and Pellizzari (2000). Forster and Pellizzari (2000) analyze trends in income distri-
bution in different countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.9 The data they use 
regard eleven OECD countries. In their analysis, total personal income is decom-
posed by income sources. The sources used are labor income, capital and self-em-
ployment income, taxes, and transfers. Capital income includes interest, dividends, 
and realized capital gains.10  
Forster and Pellizzari (2000) report the evolution of total income inequality in 
the eleven OECD countries, decomposing it into the contribution of different income 
sources. This decomposition is performed according to the procedure in Shorrocks 
(1982). Shorrocks (1982) deals with the problem of finding a rule that determines 
the contribution of factor k to inequality I of total income y. Shorrocks (1982) shows 
9 The data of the report, in turn, come from a questionnaire that the OECD sent to national experts. Efforts 
in sending a questionnaire as detailed as possible have been made. The level of comparability is, however, 
lower than would be the case if one used harmonized surveys, such as the data from the LIS project. 
The advantage is that data for more countries and time periods are available. See the Appendix in (Forster,
Pellizzari, 2000) for details. 
10 Self-employment income is included in the category of labor income in Germany and Canada. 
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that there is only one decomposition rule that satisfies a set of convenient axioms, 
including, notably, that the contributions of all factors add up to the measure of 
inequality of total income. This rule states that the contribution to inequality of factor 
k, kS   equals  
 
 
Cov
Var
k k yS I
y
  
 
The contribution of a factor thus defined depends positively on its share in total 
income. In order to control for changes in the share of the factor, Forster and Pel-
lizzari (2000) perform a shift share analysis over Sk. This exercise permits them to 
isolate how much of the change in inequality is due to the change in the distribution 
of the factor itself, which they call its “net contribution”. The data I present are pre-
cisely the changes in the “net contribution” of capital and self-employment income to 
inequality. Forster and Pellizzari (2000) measure inequality using the Gini coeffi-
cient; thus, the data I present is, in words, the change in the Gini coefficient due to 
changes in the distribution of capital and self-employment income. In what follows, 
it will be denoted for short the Contribution of Capital Income to Inequality, or CKI. 
Denoting the average capital and total incomes over the population by k  and y , 
respectively, the CKI is hence defined as k
y
CKI S
k
 .11  
The first column in Table B1 in Appendix B displays the change in CKI for dif-
ferent OECD countries. The pattern of change varies across countries. In the Nether-
lands, France, and the US, the net contribution of capital and self-employment in-
come has decreased. In Italy, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the UK, Canada, 
and Australia, it has increased. The magnitude of these figures is substantial. The ab-
solute value is larger than 2.5 percentage points (pp) in eight out of the eleven 
countries considered, and higher than 4 pp in five of them. In order to put these mag-
nitudes into perspective, notice that the increase in income inequality in the US from 
1968 to 1992 is measured by an increase in the Gini coefficient of 3.5 pp, and the one 
for the UK (deemed as “unparalleled” in (Atkinson, 1997)) was of 10 pp.  
The theoretical results in the previous sections relate changes in capital in-
come inequality to the level of participation costs. The second column of Table B1 
in Appendix B displays information on trading costs for the countries stated above. 
The data come from (Domowitz et al., 2001) and correspond to average explicit 
11 In order to grasp what the CKI captures, consider the case where income comes only from two sources, 
capital and labor income (k and W). Then, the CKI can be written in the following way, 
                                                       
     
 2
Var Covk k W I y
CKI
SCV ykWk
                                                  (3.1) 
where SVC is the square coefficient of variation. Equation (3.1) shows that the contribution of capital 
income to inequality depends positively on the variance of capital income and on the covariance between 
capital and labor income, appropriately normalized. Indeed, capital income contributes to inequality to 
the extent that is unequally distributed (as captured by the variance term) and to the extent that it covaries 
with other sources of income. In consequence, the CKI rises either if capital income becomes more un-
equally distributed or if it becomes more correlated with labor income.  
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equity trading costs, which include commissions and fees paid for each transaction, in 
basis points. The data refer to the years 1996 to 1998. Ideally, one would want to use 
data from the 1980s, the start of the period considered in the inequality data, but 
these data are not available. Nevertheless, two points justify the use of the proposed 
data. First, the main factors affecting participation costs in the last few decades have 
been all-pervasive (technical progress, privatization, social security crises, etc.) In 
that respect, the ranking of countries in terms of participation costs may not have 
changed substantially over the 1980s and 1990s. Second, the country studies in (Guiso 
et al., 2002) – for Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US – suggest 
an ordering in terms of financial market access costs similar to the data provided for 
the available years of the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, market participation rates (not 
costs) tended to be highest in the US and, among the continental European countries, 
the lowest in Italy and the highest in the Netherlands.12  
Figure B1 in Appendix B plots the change in the net contribution of capital 
and self-employment income to inequality against explicit equity trading costs. Fi-
gure B1 shows that there is a tendency for the net contribution of capital and self- 
-employment income to inequality to have fallen in countries where trading costs are 
low and to have risen in countries where trading costs are high. In other words, this 
figure suggests a positive relationship between the change in CKI and the level of 
trading costs. A closer look at the figure reveals that the slope of this relationship is 
higher for Continental European countries.  
4. Linking Model and Data 
In the previous sections, I have provided a partial characterization of how 
capital income inequality depends on participation costs. Capital income inequality 
displays a hump shape in participation costs. When the level of participation costs is 
high, a decrease in participation costs brings to the profitable financial market indi-
viduals who are already rich. Capital income inequality, as a result, increases. The op-
posite occurs when participation costs are low. This mechanism offers a plausi- 
ble explanation of the data presented in the previous section, assuming a uniform 
decrease in participation costs in all countries. Consider that the US, France, and 
the Netherlands lie to the left of the critical level fˆ  of Proposition 1, and the rest of 
the countries to the right. Participation costs have fallen in all countries. The conse-
quence has been a decrease in the CKI in the US, France, and the Netherlands, and 
an increase in the remaining countries.  
In order to interpret the data in this way, some points need to be consider- 
ed. The first point relates to quantitative issues: can the mechanism proposed yield 
changes in inequality large enough under sensible conditions? Second, even if this is 
the case, the theoretical framework matches only imperfectly the data presented. 
Thus, several caveats need to be borne in mind when interpreting the data in the light 
of the model proposed. These points are considered in this section.  
12 The exception is the UK, with high participation in the 1990s despite ranking high in the trading 
cost data. The reason for this discrepancy is most likely the unusually intense privatization of the Thatcher 
years. Indeed, direct stockholding in 1983 was lower in the UK than in Germany (Guiso et al., 2002). 
Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 11-12                                      565 
4.1 Quantitative Issues 
The model presented is extremely stylized and, hence, cannot be hoped to 
offer accurate quantitative results. Nevertheless, a numerical example using sensi- 
ble values can convey how large the effects in the model can be. To do so, I use 
the specification with log utility and two-state returns and “calibrate” the model as 
carefully as possible (see Appendix B). For the exercise, I focus on participation rates 
instead of participation costs, as the former can be measured with more accuracy.13  
Figure 4.1 shows the Gini coefficient for capital income as a function of 
the rate of market participation.14 The range of values that the Gini coefficient takes 
is indeed substantial, rising from its lowest to its highest point by 30 pp. In 
the downward sloping portion of the curve, it can be seen that a change in par-
ticipation of 10 pp is associated with a change in the Gini of approximately 5 pp, 
a slope of around 1/2. The slope of the upward sloping portion is even higher in ab-
solute value.15  
The relation between these magnitudes is not wide off the mark relative to 
the observed changes in the CKI and in participation. From the data above, among 
the economies that have seen the CKI decrease (the US, the Netherlands, and France), 
the average change has been of -1.7 pp. Among those where it has increased, the ave-
rage change has been 3.3 pp. As to changes in participation, according to Guiso et al. 
(2002), from 1989 to 1995, the proportion of the population holding risky financial 
FIGURE 4.1 
                              
13 Another reason to focus on participation rates, instead of costs, from a quantitative perspective is that 
the use of participation costs suffers from the partial equilibrium version of the equity premium puzzle (see 
(Haliassos, Michaelides, 2003)). 
14 In the case where the only source of income is capital, as in the stylized model presented, the CKI 
obviously equals the Gini coefficient of capital income. 
15 In the figure, the peak of inequality occurs at very low levels of participation. This is because of the low 
risk aversion implicit in logarithmic utility. In (unreported) exercises with constant relative risk aversion
utility, the peak moved rightwards as risk aversion increased. Incidentally, the magnitude of the changes 
also decreased, with a range of Gini of around 13 pp when using a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 10. 
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assets rose by 8.7 pp and 6.5 pp in the US and Italy, respectively. In Germany, from 
1983 to 1995, it rose by 6.5 pp. Obviously, these changes in financial ownership struc-
ture are partly explained by mechanisms unrelated to the ones considered in this paper 
(such as the looming retirement of the baby boom generation). However, as mentioned 
above, there is wide agreement in the relevant literature that falling participation costs 
have been a key factor behind these trends.  
In sum, plausible changes in participation can have a sizable impact on capital 
income inequality. Indeed, in the model proposed, changes in inequality are driven 
by the capital income gain of participation, arising from the risk premium. The im-
pact can be large because so is the risk premium, particularly when compounded over 
a number of years. According to the Mehra and Prescott estimates, the risk premium 
compounded over ten years can be as high as 88 percent.  
4.2 Caveats 
The mechanism highlighted in this paper can account qualitatively for 
the evidence presented above and is, furthermore, sizable enough under sensible con-
ditions. There are, however, several caveats regarding the suggested interpretation of 
this evidence. First, the data includes jointly income from capital and from self-em-
ployment, except for Germany and Canada. In most of the countries (except, for in-
stance, Italy), the importance of self-employment income is fairly small, so that it is 
not likely that the movements in the contribution to inequality are driven by self- 
-employment income. Moreover, the type of argument developed in this chapter could 
be adapted to self-employment income. Recent work, such as (Fonseca et al., 2001), 
emphasizes the importance of firm start-up costs as a deterrent to entrepreneurship, 
especially regarding small business and self-employment. In their model, changes in 
start-up costs affect the ability threshold required for an individual to become an en-
trepreneur instead of a worker. The mechanism is hence similar to the one in this 
paper, although there are obvious limitations in the analogy. For example, start-up 
costs are probably more related to bureaucracy than to the forces likely to have low-
ered participation costs in recent decades, such as computerization.  
Second, the data presented on capital income does not include unrealized ca-
pital gains. Realized capital gains are included. The argument of this paper hinges on 
the assumption that risky financial markets, such as the stock market, yield a higher 
return than the risk-free bond. It is difficult to assess if, on average, realized capital 
gains suffice to yield this equity premium.  
Third, the measure of inequality used in the data is the CKI while the results 
of the model were derived for capital income inequality. As was shown above (see 
Equation (3.1) in footnote 11), the contribution of a factor to inequality depends, not 
only on the inequality of the factor itself, but also on the correlation of the factor 
income with other sources of income. The model presented has no predictions re-
garding correlations between incomes from different sources, as it does not include 
any other source of income apart from capital income. Labor income could be includ-
ed and allowed to be heterogeneous and the results would generally be strengthened 
if wealth and labor income are positively correlated. In that case, when participation 
costs are high, those who enter the financial market as access is made easier are rich 
not only in terms of capital income, but also in terms of labor income. Their increase 
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in capital income raises not only capital income inequality, but also the covariance 
between labor and capital income. The reverse occurs when participation costs are low. 
There are several mechanisms that would yield such a positive relation between wealth 
and labor income. A positive correlation between wealth and labor income would arise 
if labor income heterogeneity arises from differences in ability and ability is positively 
correlated with wealth. Alternatively, this positive correlation would arise if labor in-
come heterogeneity arises from differences in education and education decisions are 
taken in a setting of borrowing constraints (see (Pellicer-Gallardo, 2005)).  
Finally, in order to relate the data to the theoretical results, the measure of 
trading costs in the data is taken as a proxy for a fixed cost even if explicit trading 
costs are expressed in basis points. This may not be so problematic, for trading costs 
are generally non-linear in the amount invested (high volumes usually face lower 
rates) and, hence, considering them as a fixed cost can be a good approximation.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has argued that technical change affects inequality not only through 
labor income differentials, but also through capital income. Computerization and 
the development of information technologies have decreased the costs of access to 
financial markets. This fall of access costs has prompted participation in profitable 
financial markets by different groups in the population. The groups of the popula- 
tion who enter the financial market depend on the level of participation costs. If par-
ticipation costs are high, those who enter are rich, and their entrance drives inequality 
upwards. The opposite occurs where participation costs are low. Using a parsimo-
nious model of costly financial market participation, it was shown that this result 
holds if the financial market is risky and utility displays DARA.  
Data on the contribution of capital income to inequality in eleven OECD coun-
tries has been presented. Consistently with the theoretical mechanism proposed, 
countries where the contribution of capital income to inequality has gone down, such 
as the US, France, and the Netherlands, are those where trading costs are the lowest. 
In the rest of the countries, the contribution of capital income to inequality has in-
creased. Moreover, the magnitude of these changes in inequality is substantial, and  
it was shown that the mechanism proposed can deliver changes of such magnitude 
under sensible conditions. Therefore, even if there are several caveats to bear in mind 
when doing so, the mechanism highlighted in the theoretical sections can rationalize 
the data presented.  
The results of the paper suggest that technical change and financial liberali-
zation, if they succeed at broadening access, may have differential effects on in-
equality in emerging and advanced economies. Only in advanced economies would 
they help reduce inequality. For this scenario to occur, however, barriers to entry to 
the financial market need to be already low. It is important to bear in mind that these 
barriers are not only monetary. Education, for example, also matters for financial 
market participation. Indeed, as argued in (Pellicer-Gallardo, 2005), it seems plau-
sible to assume that participation costs are heterogeneous across education groups. 
Technical change and financial liberalization alone may not be enough to bring par-
ticipation costs for the uneducated low enough to induce them to participate, hence 
requiring complementary educational policies.  
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APPENDIX A
Proofs
 
A1 Proof of Lemma 1 
i)   In order to prove lemma 1, the following argument is used. Define w  as the w 
such that    P NV w V w   It is shown that, for any w  it holds that 
   P NV w V ww ww w! w w   i.e., at any point where  PV w  and  NV w  cross, the slope 
of 
P
V  is higher than that of 
N
V   Then, using an argument in the spirit of the index 
methodology (see (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 615)) this implies, by continuity, that 
 PV w  and  NV w  cross only once, at w , and that, furthermore, for iw w!   
P NV V!   and vice versa.  
Using this argument, it is necessary just to show that for any w  it holds that 
                                                     P NV w V ww w
w w!w w                                          (5.1) 
Denoting  Pu c w   to the maximum utility of a participant with wealth w con-
dition (5.1) can be written as 
                                          1 1P NE u c w r x r u c wS ª ºc c   !  ¬ ¼    
which, using the first-order condition (3), simplifies to 
                                                      P NE u c w u c wª ºc c ! ¬ ¼                                     (5.2) 
 
Now, at w  it holds, by definition, 
                                                           P NE u c u cª º§ ·¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼                                          (5.3) 
 
By Jensen’s Inequality, conditions (5.2) and (5.3) hold simultaneously when 
 u cc  is a concave transformation of  u c   This, in turn, is equivalent to 
   u c u ccc c   being decreasing (see (Gollier, 2001, Proposition 4)).16 Thus, if the uti-
lity function exhibits Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion,     0P NV V www  !w  .  
16 In particular, consider, as in (Gollier, 2001)), the function I  as the transformation from u  into uc 
Thus,     u c u cIc    Totally differentiating this expression yields that 0Icc   (i.e.,  u cc  is a con-
cave transformation of  u c ) is equivalent to        u c u c u c u cccc cc cc c  t    for all c. This latter condi-
tion is, in turn, equivalent to    u c u ccc c   being decreasing. 
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ii)   By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have 
                                    
 
   
P
P N
E V w
d f
w
df E V w V w
w w
w ª º¬ ¼w  w wª º¬ ¼w w


 
                                 (5.4) 
 
which, using the first-order condition (2.3), simplifies to 
                                     
 
   
P
P N
E u c wd
w
df E u c w u c w


ª ºc ¬ ¼ ª ºc c  ¬ ¼


 
 
 
Hence, 0d w
df
!  holds when conditions (5.2) and (5.3) above hold simultaneously. 
Thus, as shown before, it holds for any DARA utility function. 
 
A2 Proof of Lemma 2 
It is straightforward that iNk w
§ ·¨ ¸© ¹  is increasing. I focus, hence, on 
i
PE k w
ª º§ ·¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼   Differentiating 
i
PE k w
ª º§ ·¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼  with respect to 
iw  yields 
i i i
Pi i
d d
E k w r w x w x
dw dw
SS
ª º § · § ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸« »© ¹ © ¹¬ ¼     
 
The first two terms in the sum are clearly positive. Given the assumed positive 
risk premium, the third term is positive as well if 0i dw
idw
S§ · ! ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
 Gollier (2001) in 
Proposition 8 proves that this is the case if utility is DARA.  
It remains to check that i iP NE k w k w
ª º§ · § ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸« »© ¹ © ¹¬ ¼ !  at the discontinuity point w  
This follows directly from equation (2.5). The difference between the two portions 
equals      P NE k w k w w w xS   ª º¬ ¼     which is positive, since so are the three 
terms in the product.  
 
A3 Proof of Proposition 1  
The proof uses the same line of argument as that of lemma 1. First, the local 
extreme values for the inequality indices as a function of f are characterized. The le-
vel of f at which the local extreme values are attained is denoted fˆ . Second, it is 
shown that, at fˆ , the inequality indices are concave in f. Using an argument in 
the line of the index methodology, it is then concluded that there can only be a uni-
que local extreme value, which is a maximum and is attained at fˆ . The result in 
the proposition follows immediately.  
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Some additional notation will prove useful. Denote by k  the average capital 
income in the population: 
0
k kdG
f ³  Each individual’s capital income relative to 
the population average will be denoted by N  k
k
N  . We can have PN  or NN  if 
the individual participates in the financial market or not, respectively, and, for 
the indifferent individual (with wealth w ), we will write PN  in case of participation 
and NN  in case of non-participation.  
The Gini coefficient of capital income can be written as  
                                          2 1
GkdG
Gini
kdG
 ³³                                           (5.5) 
 
and the GE family of measures is defined as17  
                            ( )
1 1
1 1
k
GE dG
kdG
T
T
T T T T
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ © ¹
³ ³  
 
Consider first the GE family. Denote by  h N  the integrand in the definition of 
the GE measures:  
                                          
1
1
h TN NT T{   
Thus, using lemma 1, the GE measures in this model become: 
                        0
1
1
w
N Pw
GE h dG h dGN N T T
f   ³ ³


                         (5.6) 
Differentiating (5.6) with respect to f using Leibniz’s rule, and rearranging 
terms, yields 
         
1
1
P N
P N
P N
h hd dw
GE g w GE
df df
N N TN N T TN N
ª º§ ·    « »¨ ¸¨ ¸ « »© ¹¬ ¼
      
     (5.7) 
 
The term outside the square brackets is strictly negative, by lemmas 1 and 2. 
Thus, 0d GE
df
  when 
                             
   
 
1
1
P N
P N
h h
GE
N N T T TN N
§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹
 
 
                               (5.8) 
17 For the special cases where 1T   and 0 the index becomes  1 logk kGE dG
kdG kdG
§ · ¨ ¸³ ³© ¹³  and 
 0 log kGE dG
kdG
§ ·  ¨ ¸³© ¹³ , which correspond to the Theil index and the Mean Logarithmic Deviation, 
respectively (see (Cowell, 2000)). 
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Denote by fˆ  the level of fˆ  such that (5.8) holds. In order to check the con-
cavity of GE at fˆ  differentiate (5.7) with respect to f. Since, by construction, at fˆ  
(5.8) holds and 0d GE
df
  the expression becomes simply 
                    22 P NP N
P N
h hd dw d
GE g w
df dfdf
N NN N N N
ª º§ ·   « »¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
      
               (5.9) 
 
Since, as said before, the term outside the square brackets is strictly negative, 
2
0
2
d GE
df
  if                               0P N
P N
h hd
df
N N
N N
§ · !¨ ¸© ¹
 
 
                                  (5.10) 
Now, notice that the expression inside the parenthesis is the slope of 
the segment connecting  Nh N  and  Ph N  in the  h N  schedule. It is then clear 
that (5.10) will hold if  h N  is convex for all N  and 0P Nd df d dfN N   !  . First, 
by differentiating twice the definition of  h N  it can be easily checked that  h N  is 
indeed convex   Second, by the definition of P NN    a sufficient condition for 
0P Nd dfN   !  is that 0P Nd dfk   !  and     0P Ndwdk df g w k kdf         
The two conditions follow from lemmas 1 and 2.  
For the Gini coefficient, the same argument applies. The expression for 
d Gini
df
 is               12
2
P Nd dw Ginik kGini g w G w
df df k
 ª º  « »¬ ¼
                    (5.11) 
At fˆ  (where fˆ  is defined, again, as the level of f where 0)d Gini
df
   GINI 
is concave. Indeed, differentiating (5.11) with respect to f and evaluating the expre-
ssion at fˆ  yields 
                         
22
2
2 P N
d dw k kGini g w
df kdf
§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
   
which is clearly negative. 
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APPENDIX B
Values Numerical Example 
The numerical example presented corresponds to the specification of the log 
utility function and two-state market returns. The initial wealth distribution is as-
sumed to be lognormal with parameters P  and 2V . Market excess returns in the two 
states, Hx  and Lx , are chosen so as to match the first two moments of Mehra and 
Prescott estimates, when compounded over ten years, following the procedure used 
in (Bertaut, Haliassos, 1997)).18 This yields excess returns of 1 89Hx    and 
0 13Lx     and a riskless rate of 0.8 The variables of the model w and f are inter-
preted as normalized by the median initial wealth eP   This normalization makes 
the Gini coefficient of capital income independent of P  so that the initial wealth 
distribution using the normalized variables is fully characterized by the parame- 
ter V  19 In order to give a value to this parameter, I use the fact that there is a simple 
one-to-one relationship between V  and the Gini coefficient from a lognormal distri-
bution.20 Thus, I give V  the value that generates the Gini coefficient for wealth “ty-
pically observed” in industrialized countries, on the basis of the evidence in (Davies, 
Shorrocks, 1999). Davies and Shorrocks (1999) show the Gini coefficient for wealth 
in eleven OECD countries in the 1980s. These range from 0.52 in Japan to 0.79 in 
the US, with a cross-country average of 0.65. Thus, the Gini for initial wealth is 
taken as 0.65 which yields 1 32V      
Data Sources 
TABLE B0 
Countries Years Source 
Inequality (CKI) 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden, UK, US 
Mid80s–mid90s 
(Forster, 
Pellizzari, 
2000) 
Trading Costs 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden, UK, US 
1996–1998 (Domowitz et al., 2001) 
Participation Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK, US selected years from early 1980s to 1998 
Guiso et al. 
(2002) 
18 The yearly mean return is 6.98 % with a standard deviation of 16.54 %. The estimate for the riskless rate 
is 0.8 %. 
19 This is achieved by using the property of the lognormal distribution according to which if x  is lognor-
mal with parameters P  and 2V   then e xP  is lognormal with parameters 0 and 2V   (see (Aitchison,
Brown, 1957)). 
20 In particular, 2 1
2
Gini N V§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹  where  N x  is the standard normal distribution evaluated at x  (see 
(Aitchison, Brown, 1957))   
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TABLE B1 
Change CKI a Trading Costs b
Australia  3.0 49.5 
Canada  3.0 25.3 
Denmark  0.8 28.1 
Finland  5.7 27.9 
France  -0.2 22.8 
Germany  2.6 24.3 
Italy  8.0 26.3 
Netherlands  -4.4 23.0 
Sweden  5.3 26.2 
UK  4.4 39.3 
US  -0.5 8.3 
Notes: a Change in Contribution of Capital an Self Employment Income to Inequality from mid 80s to mid 90s. 
Absolute change. See Section 3. Source: (OECD, 2000). 
b  Basis points. Source: Elkins/McSherry Co., Inc. Quoted in (Domowitz et al., 2001). 
GRAPH B1  
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